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"There are two millions of Romanians working abroad. There they learn how
long a coffee break should be. It is a new Romania we have built ..., to which
building we have contributed."
"Sint doua milioane de romani care lucreaza in strainatate. Acolo invata cit
trebuie sa tina o pauza de cafea. Este o noua Romanie pe care noi am con-
stru..., la constructia careia noi am participat." Adrian Nastase, Romanian
prime-minister, (Premier cu discernamant avariat. Bursa, Vineri 16 July, 2004)
Labor migration originating in post-communist countries has been investigated mostly from the
point of view of economic outcomes. The remittances – money and goods – sent back home by
migrant workers, as well as decrease in unemployment, have a profound impact on the living stan-
dards of people in these societies (e.g. Adams and Page 2003). In addition, there is a widespread belief
that labor migration has a positive effect on human capital: people who worked in a Western country
are perceived as having been exposed to a more rigorous work ethic (see for instance the Romanian
prime-minister's discourse), as well as having acquired new skills and knowledge. I contend in this
paper that the effects of migration on democratic transition are complex and, in addition to these eco-
nomic and social aspects, they potentially include significant changes in cultural variables, including
attitudes, values, networks and norms that are relevant for democratic processes. In short, migration
may play an important role on political culture. This study aims to analyse who are those who worked
abroad and what is the role played by labor migration on quality of their citizenship in post-commu-
nist Romania.
Studying people who were involved in labor migration has some similarities with studying civic
activists. Both categories of people are of about the same magnitude in the case of Romania, have
emerged only after 1990, and, as I am going to argue, consist of people who are exposed to new life
experiences, having a potential of re-socialization that is relevant for the quality of their citizenship.
The strongest predictors of civic engagement are factors of social inclusion (e.g. Curtis at all 1992).
This seems to be the case of migrants as well (Sandu 2003 ch. 5). Both cases are difficult to study since
resocializing effects are shown to depend, in the case of associations, and are expected to depend, in
the case of migrants, by a series of individual and contextual attributes that are difficult to measure and
take into account. Another challenge comes from the difficulty to investigate the causal direction
between attitudinal change and life experiences. Members in associations and labor migrants seem to
differ in one important aspect, that of political representation. Activists are important because they
tend to have a stronger voice than other citizens in the political life. There have been many cases dur-
ing democratic transition when small civic groups had a significant input in devising new policies.
Migrants stand to the opposite. Before the Romanian 2004 local elections several commentators spec-
ulated about the influence of labor migration on the electoral outcome due to absence of important
segments of population and to allegedly different political views. Although having an underrepresent-
ed group is an important source of political effects of labor migration, its potential outcomes are much
broader. First of all, social learning processes induced by migration experiences could affect former
migrants long after they returned home. In addition, it makes sense to expect some spillover effects
on members of their family or non-members with whom they have close social ties. Another category
of political outcomes stems from the perceptions of general populace (those who did not migrate)
about how labor migration affects their life. People tend to be happy that pressure on the local labor
market decreased, that local economies get stronger as a result of remittances, and, in the same time,
worried that image of Romania is affected by stories in Western media about illegal workers and delin-
quents from Romania. 
What kind of political effects should be expected? How diverse? Should we expect that, as a gener-
al tendency, people who have direct contact with a Western society are faster in becoming better
democrats, or on the contrary, the hardship experienced by many who were labor migrants made
them more reluctant to the values and norms that characterize Western world? Or migration experi-
ence is just one among many others during the transition period, and its effects tend to be insignifi-
cant? Or maybe, situations are very diverse, and even when effects are important they tend to be of
contrary type and, overall, to cancel out each other. Arguments could be brought in favor of each of
these views: 
1. There is significant literature, based mostly on social capital theories, as well as on some empiri-
cal evidence, showing that democratic culture can be exported by means of exporting organizations
that produce social learning effects (e.g. Mandel 2002). Volunteer association are considered to be
such organizations, and a significant part of democratic aid in the former communist countries con-
sisted in help for setting up and running NGO-s. The same theoretical arguments could be invoked to
the case of people who work abroad and get exposure to the Western type of life, including political
life. At one positive extreme, there is the case of migrant communities who got the right to elect their
own representatives (such as for local council in Rome, where a Romanian immigrant was elected).
However, these cases of direct exposure to political practices are not very frequent. Yet, social capital
theories assert that non-political learning can have significant relevance on political behavior as well
(e.g. Verba at all 1995, Putnam 1993). Skills that facilitate success of collective action can be learned at
work or by interaction with Western people and then they are a resource for political behavior. An
important attitudinal asset predicting capacity to overcame collective action dilemmas is trust in other
people (e.g. Uslaner 2002, Arrow 1972) 
2. Migrants are most often exposed to situations that decrease their qualities as good citizens. They
face hostile authorities, sometimes unsympathetic local population and unfriendly co-workers. There
are many stories with employers hiring illegal migrants and refusing to pay afterwards the promised
amount (e.g. Popa 2004). 
3. Migrants are different from the general population from the very beginning. It is likely that they
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are less trusting of authorities, possible of people in general, more accustomed to rely on informal net-
works. The group experience (Hooghe 2004, Tajfel 1981) enhances the common traits of the group.
In other words, it is not the exposure, but the group interaction with other migrants that makes
migrants become worse or better citizens.
There is tremendous variation in what kind of experiences people who work abroad encounter.
I expect that there are several categories of variables with foremost influence on quality and extent of
social learning effects: 
(1) how long is the exposure; people who leave very often and stay long at one extreme, people
who went only once and stay for days or weeks, at another. 
(2) how long ago; the vast majority of people traveled abroad during the last five years, and espe-
cially after the visa ban for Romanian was lifted by most West European nations. However, some peo-
ple worked abroad before that period. It could be an important distinction since the latest category
contains more "pioneers", i.e. people who traveled and set up abroad without any help from their
community and then initiated migratory networks1. 
(3) legal status; at one extreme people who crossed several borders illegally (e.g. Popa 2004), at the
other people with legal working contracts and visa; at the middle, probably most frequent case, peo-
ple with tourist visa who travel for work. 
(4) variables that describe capacity of the migrant to be influenced by the new context; speaking a
foreign language is likely to be an important aspect of this capacity.
In the next section, I discuss what are the attributes of a good citizen in a post-communist society,
the main dependent factor in this study, and what are their operationalizations. Then, I analyse who
are the Romanians who worked abroad, as described by a series of both individual and contextual
socio-economic variables. Finally, I investigate the effects of labor migration on political attitudes, as
well as on non-political characteristics that are expected to have an effect on quality and stability of
democracy. 
The analyses are based on four surveys representative for the entire adult population in Romania:
May 2002, October 2002, October 2003 and May 2004 Public Opinion Barometer (POB)2.
The paper concludes that former labor migrants are not significantly different with respect of most
measures of political culture. However, there are several differences, such as higher levels of social
trust and optimism among middle age migrants, that may enhance capacity to solve collective action
dilemma, which in turn have an effect on democratization. 
Good citizens in a post-communist society
The roles that mass attitudes, values and norms play on democratic consolidation are highly debated.
However, there is a large consensus that there are certain individual traits that tend to be a significant
resource for any post-totalitarian society, irrespective of its rules, institutions or any other contextual
factors. I consider two broad categories of such attributes: support for democracy and attributes that
facilitate involvement in civic activism. 
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1 Dumitru Sandu found that distinction between "pioneers" and other migrants is important in terms of social and attitudinal attrib-
utes (2003).
2 Information about surveys and data sets can be found at http://www.osf.ro/ro/bop/cercetare.html. The surveys were funded by
the Soros Foundation for an Open Society - Romania.
Support for democracy: Very low levels of generalized political support are thought to affect
quality of governance and even stability of political regimes. This is because lack of support tend to
slow down the economic reform, which in turn leads to declining efficiency of economic policy deci-
sions and, as a result, to loss of legitimacy and serious challenges to democratic consolidation  (Toka
1995: 355). The concept of political support 'refers to the way in which a person evaluatively orients
himself to a [political] object through ... his attitude' (Easton 1975: 436). There are several levels of
political support, differentiated by categories of political objects, such as support for particular incum-
bents, for governing institutions, and for the 'rules of the games'--support for democracy as a form of
government. The most important level is the latest, since the stronger support for democratic values
and the more strongly autocratic ones are rejected, the more closely the societal community will cor-
respond to a democratic community (Fuchs and Klingemann 2000). 
Another category of 'good citizen' traits consists in those attributes that facilitate involvement in
civic activism, both formal and informal. It is generally assumed that civic involvement have the poten-
tial to contribute to forming and enhancing those attitudes, knowledge and skills on which democratic
practices are based (e.g. Putnam 1995; Hooghe 1999). In addition, associations provide "the social infra-
structure of public spheres that develop agendas, test ideas, embody deliberations, and provide voice"
(Warren 2001: 61). They also speak on behalf of groups of citizens, contributing this way to the aggrega-
tion of individual judgment and to representation of collective decisions (e.g. Foley and Edwards 1996). 
Yet some scholars doubt whether civic involvement is indeed "nothing short of an infallible demo-
cratic miracle worker" (Encarnacion 2004: 14), for several main reasons. One is that civic groups pro-
vide voice to citizens but in a distorted way, which contravene to the democratic ideal of political
equality. Activists are not always representative of the citizenry as a whole in their social characteris-
tics, values and orientations. They tend to belong disproportionately to more advantaged groups and,
in consequence, the needs, and priorities they express may give unequal consideration for the needs
and orientations of all citizens (Verba et al. 1995). In addition, some scholars believe that in the Balkan
and the former soviet countries, and, at least at some extent, in the other former authoritarian coun-
tries, civic groups are of a different nature, having both determinants and effects that are not common
within Western societies (e.g. Kalb 2002). Allegedly, these differences came from the fact that the asso-
ciations that were set up and their functioning is based on the help of international organisations tend
to have only weak connections to local communities, and motivations of the local people to partici-
pate in them differ to those for the "natural grown" groups (Sampson 1996). As a result, they are less
helpful for the democratic processes than expected. Finally, it is argued that the role of civil society in
the consolidation of democracy is conditioned by political context and circumstances. Whether civic
engagement is good or bad for democracy depends upon the constitution and performance of the
political system (Berman 1997, Iglic 2003, Encarnacion 2003). 
My basic assertion is that a post-totalitarian with "imported associations" tend to fare better than
one with no associations at all. Similarly, having certain groups overrepresented by civic groups is
preferable to having no representation at all other than by regular political mechanisms. In addition,
there are several ingredients that could increase democratic value of civic activism, consisting in attrib-
utes that make activists more likely to represent other people, in spite of difference in socio-econom-
ic traits. I contend that social trust, solidarity and tolerance are attitudes that predict the individual
capacity to pay attention to the interests of out-group people. Since groups are effective in represent-
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ing and amplifying the voice of their members, I expect that a higher proportion of members with
these attitudes in an association tends to increase its democratic potential.  
Solidarity with disadvantaged and tolerance are by definition attributes describing individual's
capacity to show empathy and support for diverse and different people in a society. Group borders
based on ethnicity, religious believes, wealth, immigrant status, are easier to cross for associations
whose members are characterized by these two types of attitudes. What about social trust? There is a
vast literature implying that social trust promotes well functioning of democratic processes and stabil-
ity of democratic regimes (ex. Uslaner 2002). An important part of its reasoning is based on the asser-
tion that trust is a resource for collective action. Citizen activism is significantly affected by the capac-
ity of citizens to identify common goals and to pursue them collectively. First, it is expected that more
trustful citizens become embedded in denser and more extended social networks. Social trust, in par-
ticular, may have the potential to increase the connectives through networks that favor mobilization
for participatory acts. Thus, social trust tends to be linked with the kind of "good networks" identified
by Putnam, Iglic and others, but so difficult to identify empirically, and even more in cross-national
studies. In a study on several associations in Sweden and Germany, Stolle argues that associations that
are "more diverse, more engaged and those with weak ties, accommodate more trusting people"
(1998: 521). Second, a high level of social trust has been shown to ease people's empathy towards
other interest, by identification with their own. Optimism is another variable that, closely related to
social trust, help predicts individual propensity for collective action (Uslaner 2002).
The four categories of attitudes, social trust, optimism, solidarity with disadvantaged and tolerance,
are neither necessary nor sufficient to make civic activism good for democracy. What I claim is that,
when other conditions are constant, a higher stock of these attitudes among activists in a society tend
to facilitate more democratic outcomes.  
The variables that describe quality of citizenship in the Romanian data are 
– satisfaction with the way democracy works in Romania (1 - 'very unsatisfied', ..., 5 - 'very satisfied')
– it would better to have just one political party (1) or several political parties (0)
– an aggregate index of political trust (trust in parliament, political parties, government, justice; 0 -
'lowest trust', 1 - 'highest trust') 
– an aggregate index of tolerance (would you mind to have Roma / Hungarians / Jews / Muslims /
Jehovah Witnesses/ Homosexuals as neighbors; 0 - 'lowest tolerance', 1 'highest tolerance').
Who are the people who worked abroad?
The series of national surveys conducted between 2002 and 2004 provides information not only about
the structure but also the size of the Romanian population who worked abroad. In each of the four
surveys the proportion of former migrants is close to 5% (0.8-0.9 millions) (Table 1). Why it has not
increased during the one and a half year span covered by the surveys? One plausible explanation is that
between 2002 and 2004 the proportion of Romanians with past or present experience of working
abroad increased, but the share among them of those who are in the country at a given moment of
time decreased.  We do not know from these data what is the total proportion of Romanians who are
or have been migrants, only that their number could be significantly higher than one million. It is
worth to notice that the proportion of people who are directly affected by labor migration is much
Romanian labor migration and citizenship 11
higher, given the fact that 17% (about 3 millions) of the Romanian adults declare (in October 2002)
that someone from their household worked abroad.
Table 1. The proportion of people who declare that worked abroad in four surveys representa-
tive for Romanian population.  
What about the dynamic of labor migration? Figure 1 provides information about its longitudinal ten-
dency, as indicated by responses in an October 2002 national survey. It suggests that migration had a
steady and fast increase after 1990.
Who are the people who worked abroad? The analyses take into account several individual level
variables--gender, age, formal education, subjective income, religion (neoprotestant vs. others), eth-
nicity (Hungarian vs. others), social trust--, and locality level variables--index of life quality, size of local-
ity, ethnic diversity (% of people who are not Romanians) and religious diversity (% of people who are
not Orthodox). 
People who live in larger localities have a slightly higher chance to have had a labor migration expe-
rience (Table 2). Low educated have lower chance than medium and high educated, but no significant
difference between the last two categories (2% of the people with less than 8 years of formal educa-
tion, compared to 5% among the others). 
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May 2002
October
2002
October
2003
May 2004 Total
labor No 2096 1998 1993 2094 8181
migrant 95.1% 94.0% 95.6% 95.1% 94.9%
Yes 109 127 92 109 437
4.9% 6.0% 4.4% 4.9% 5.1%
Total 2205 2125 2085 2203 8618
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Figure 1. Last time when respondent worked abroad.
Table 2. Relationship between labor migration and type of locality of residence.
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The last year when you worked abroad
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
1958
1956
1954
1952
1950
1948
1946
1944
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
30
20
10
0
labor migrant Total
No Yes
Size of 
<10,000
3889 163 4052
96.0% 4.0% 100.0%
47.8% 37.5% 47.2%
50-200,000
1043 62 1105
94.4% 5.6% 100.0%
12.8% 14.3% 12.9%
>200,000
3210 210 3420
93.9% 6.1% 100.0%
39.4% 48.3% 39.9%
Total 8142 435 8577
94.9% 5.1% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Compared to young people, older people tend to have a smaller chance to have been migrants
when they live in small localities (1% compared to 7% in localities with less than 10000 inhabitants)
and a surprisingly closer chance in the case of larger localities (5% compare to 8% in localities with
more than 200000 inhabitants) (Table 3).
Table 3. Relationship between labor migration, age and type of locality of residence
When considered in a multivariate logistic regression model, men, young people, Hungarians, people
living in larger localities tend to have a higher chance to declare that worked abroad. 
An important attribute with regard of individual's capacity of being resocialized by labor migration
is knowledge of a foreign language. The proportion of those who worked abroad and declare that
speak a foreign language at a good or very good level is surprisingly low, 19% (Table 4). Some of them
are probably speaking a language that was not helpful in the country they worked (e.g. German in
Italy). So, more than 80% worked abroad without speaking the local language. 
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labor migrant Total
AGE No Yes
<40
Size of 
locality 
<10,000
1411 110 1521
92.8% 7.2% 44.8%
10-200,000
439 45 484
90.7% 9.3% 14.2%
>200,000
1282 110 1392
92.1% 7.9% 41.0%
Total 3132 265 3397
92.2% 7.8% 100.0%
41-60
Size of 
locality 
<50,000
1196 41 1237
96.7% 3.3% 43.4%
50-200,000
352 13 365
96.4% 3.6% 12.8%
>200,000
1187 63 1250
95.0% 5.0% 43.8%
Total 2735 117 2852
95.9% 4.1% 100.0%
>61
Size of 
locality 
<50,000
1281 12 1293
99.1% .9% 55.6%
50-200,000
252 4 256
98.4% 1.6% 11.0%
>200,000
740 37 777
95.2% 4.8% 33.4%
Total 2273 53 2326
97.7% 2.3% 100.0%
Table 4. The relationship between labor migration and knowledge of a foreign language.
What kind of citizens are those who worked abroad?
The analyses of the Romanian survey data show in most cases no significant difference between for-
mer migrants and other people in terms of variables that describe quality of citizenship. This come less
as a surprise after finding in the previous section that less than a quarter of those who worked abroad
speak a foreign language, a fact that is likely to decrease exposure to a different political context.
Distribution of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Romania, support for multipartitism and
political trust do not differ significantly between former labor migrants and the rest of population. A
bivariate relationship indicates that migrants are more tolerant, but a multivariate analysis shows that
this is due to the fact that men, younger people, and Hungarians are more often migrants, and these
categories are associated with higher tolerance.
When age is taken into account, an interesting dynamic of the relationship between migration on
the one side, generalized trust and optimism on the other side, can be noticed (Figure 2). Younger
people who worked abroad show less social trust than younger people who were not labor migrants.
People in their forties who worked abroad are much more trusting than the rest of the population,
irrespective of age and migrant status. A similar result holds for the relationship between labor migra-
tion, age and optimism (Figure 3) One plausible explanation is that people in their forties and fiftiel
tend to be those with longer experience as labor migrants, therefore finding higher level of social trust
and optimism among them brings support to the 'good socialization' hypothesis. Unfortunately, our
pooled data sample does not provide any information about circumstances of work experiences--
when, for how long, if legal, and so on--, therefore such conclusion is only tentative and needs further
verification on more refined data.  
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Labor migrant
Foreign language No Yes Total
Very good
351 
4.3%
44 
10.1%
395 
4.6%
Good
517 
6.3%
40 
9.2%
557 
6.5%
Poor
448 
5.5%
35 
8%
483 
5.6%
No
6592 
80.6%
312 
71.4%
6904 
80.1%
NA
273 
3.3%
6 
1.4%
279 
3.2%
Total 8181 100% 437 100% 8618 100%
Figure 2. The relationship between labor migration, age and social trust.
Note: Social trust variable is dichotomous, with '0' for 'people cannot be trusted' and '1' for people can be trusted.
Figure 3. The relationship between labor migration, age and optimism.
Note: Optimism variable is dichotomous, with '0' for those who say that country goes in a wrong direction and '1' for think
that direction is right
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Discussions
Does labor migration matters for political culture of post-communist societies? The analyses in this
paper tried to provide an answer, based on a unique pooled sample of 11221 cases, representative for
the Romanian adult population. Its remarkable size allowed attaining statistical significance when study-
ing the relatively small proportion of former migrants. In addition, it included both individual respons-
es and locality level information. Yet, pooling survey data came on the expense of using a limited num-
ber of variables, with no information to describe circumstances of labor migration exposure. Therefore,
further investigations able to distinguish between various categories of migrants are clearly needed.
One of the general finding of this study is that migrants are no better or worse than others with
respect of most measures of political culture. Neither bad experiences, which are very common as we
know from qualitative studies on communities of East European migrants living in Western countries,
nor positive ones, expected by many policy makers and political commentators3 do not seem to leave
a significant mark on former migrants' political views. Both easy to change and relatively shallow atti-
tudes, such as political trust, and more fundamental and stable, such as support for democratic values,
display very similar distributions among those who worked abroad and those who did not. So, it is not
clear if migration has any effect on them. The fact that most of the migrants do not speak a foreign lan-
guage makes the "no effect hypothesis" entirely plausible. But it is still possible that effects exist but
they canceled each other, either in individual cases, or for categories of people considered together. 
However, there are several important differences that may be attributed to labor migration.
Optimism and social trust, two attributes that are central for the social capital theories of civic engage-
ment, are significantly higher for migrants in their forties and fifties than for other people. These
results are consistent with the fact that at least in the case of people longer exposure to labor migra-
tion significant change in attitudes and norms that facilitate success of collective action can be
observed. 
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